The effect of import competition from low-wage countries on U.S. inflationary pressure is estimated using a new methodology that identifies the causal response of prices to comparative advantage-induced supply shocks in these nations. The results of a panel covering 325 manufacturing industries from 1997 to 2006 show that imports from nine low-wage countries are associated with strong downward pressure on prices. When these nations capture a 1% share of the U.S. sector, the sector's producer prices decrease by 2.35%. Because import competition also influences the skewness of the distribution of price changes, it is likely to have impacted U.S. equilibrium inflation.
In this paper, we develop a new methodology to estimate the causal effect of LWC import competition on U.S. prices, documenting that it is much more profound than is commonly assumed. The presented strategy is motivated by the oldest theory of international trade, comparative advantage. A wide literature, including Trefler (1993) , Davis and Weinstein (2001) , and Romalis (2004) , documents that labor abundant countries have a comparative advantage in labor intensive sectors. The starting observation of the analysis is that the relation between comparative advantage and imports also holds at the margin: if the aggregate industrial output of LWCs grows, exports to the United States increase much more in labor intensive sectors than in capital intensive sectors. Further, we show how marginal trade flows induced by comparative advantage can identify the relative effect of LWC exports on U.S. prices.
The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, the evolution of U.S. imports from nine LWCs is documented for the years from 1997 to 2006. The comparative advantage of these nations is concentrated in labor-intensive industries. The composition of LWC exports has been remarkably stable over the last decade, while trade volume has grown rapidly. Consequently, U.S. import competition has increased the most in labor-intensive sectors. It is then shown that the relative increase in import competition in labor-intensive sectors is most pronounced when the growth of LWC industrial output is the highest. In other words, the interaction between the growth rates of LWC industrial output and U.S. sectoral labor intensity (proxying for LWC labor intensity) can predict changes in U.S. import competition. We call this interaction component the ''comparative advantage-induced'' component of trade.
In a second step, an empirical framework is developed that identifies how comparative advantage-induced trade flows affect U.S. prices. The empirical analysis draws on Bernard et al. (2006) , who utilize variation in sectoral import competition from China to analyze U.S. firm entry and exit dynamics. As these authors are well aware, sectoral import shares themselves are endogenous to U.S. demand. They, therefore, use ad valorem tariffs, freight rates, and lagged import shares to instrument for these trade flows.
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While such instruments are appropriate for the long-run analysis of Bernard et al. (2006) , they vary little from year to year and are thus not well suited to examine the rather instantaneous effect of import competition on prices. Thus a new instrumentation strategy is developed that identifies the response of prices to LWC import competition by utilizing comparative advantage-induced supply shocks in these nations. Because the analysis is in first differences and includes year dummies, all shocks are relative shocks, i.e., relative changes in import competition are related to changes in relative prices. Due to the additional presence of fixed effects by sector, the temporary component of the relative shocks above or below the sector's trend is utilized. It is then shown that the latter component does not seem to be related to U.S. demand and supply shocks.
In the third step, the empirical results are presented. The empirical results show that LWC import competition has had a profound impact on U.S. relative producer prices. 3 The instrumental variable (IV) estimates reveal a negative relationship between changes in LWC import share and changes in U.S. producer prices. The results show that when the nine LWCs capture a 1% share in a U.S. sector, U.S. producer prices decrease by 2.35%. This relative price effect stands in stark contrast to OLS estimates predicting a significant and positive correlation between the two variables. The analysis also examines the size of the aggregate relative price shocks. This exercise requires comparing the actual realization of price changes to the hypothetical distribution of price changes that would have prevailed in the absence of LWC import competition. This calculation suggests that over the examined period, an increase in LWC import competition was on average equivalent to a 0.5 percentage point downward annual shock on the producer price index (PPI) inflation rate. It is argued that these relative price shocks are also likely to have reduced U.S. equilibrium inflation because they have a strong impact on the distribution of sectoral price changes. The distribution of these relative price shocks is left-skewed, implying that the distribution of actual price changes would have been more right-skewed in the absence of such shocks. In the presence of menu costs, the skewness of relative shocks has an effect on equilibrium inflation owing to the asymmetric price responses of firms to small and large shocks. Thus, similar to the findings of Ball and Mankiw (1995) that much of the movements in postwar U.S. equilibrium inflation can be explained by how large shocks such as the oil crises have affected the skewness of relative price changes, the empirical results support the view that relative price shocks induced by LWC import competition may well be one of the reasons for the moderate U.S. inflation during the last decade.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, discusses the evolution of LWC import competition, and documents the fact that comparative advantage can explain marginal imports from LWCs. Section 3 lays down the empirical framework and discusses the identifying assumption. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 analyses the impact of relative price changes stemming from LWC shocks on aggregate U.S. inflation. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Chen et al. (2009) introduce a related strategy; identifying the pro-competitive effect of trade within a set of eight European nations. The authors instrument for trade with transportation costs, good bulkiness, and a measure of the geographic potential for trade derived from a gravity equation. 3 The direct effect of changes in import competition on U.S. import prices is not analyzed because the latter are not available on a bilateral basis and because, furthermore, aggregate import price data are available only for a small number of sectors.
Comparative advantage and the evolution of LWC imports
China, Brazil, Indonesia, India, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam define the LWC countries used to examine the effect of import competition on U.S. prices.
4 Fig. 1 shows the increasing importance of imports from these nine LWCs for the United States. In 2006, their exports to the United States were worth over USD 600 billion, more than 5.5% of the U.S. GDP, and make up one-third of total U.S. imports. Even more impressive is the growth rate of LWC imports; they were worth a mere 2.5% of the U.S. GDP in 1997. This section first documents the evolution of LWC trade to the United States. While the overall volume of imports from these nations grew substantially over the last decade, the composition of these imports has been stable. The section then shows that the static comparative advantage and the growth rate of industrial output in LWCs can explain marginal trade flows, i.e., changes in import competition.
Labor intensity and import competition
In which sectors is import competition from China and the other LWCs most intense? Has the composition of these imports changed over time? To address these issues, a measure of ''low-wage import competition'' is needed. The empirical analysis uses sectoral and annual trade data from the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) from 1997 to 2006. The import data are classified according to the six-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) and the selected trade type is the General Customs value. The overlap of industry information from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers and the price data from the Bureau of Labor and Statistics yields 325 sectors (NAICS codes 311111 to 339999).
The analysis follows Bernard et al. (2006) in defining low-wage import competition as the expenditure share of imports from the nine LWCs divided by total U.S. sales. U.S. sales equal the sum of world imports plus domestic shipments. Our measure of low-wage import competition in sector j at time t is denoted by m lwc,j,t and defined as m lwc,j,t
Value LWC Imports j,t 1 10 P te97À06 ðValue World Imports j,t þValue Domestic Shipments j,t Þ
:
To make sure that the results are not driven by the endogenous response of U.S. sales to U.S. demand, the value of domestic shipments plus world imports is averaged over our sample. Our measure of import penetration equals 0.01 in a sector in which imports from the country in question amount to 1% of average U.S. sales in that sector.
It is noteworthy that in the analysis below, the focus is on absolute changes in import penetration. This strategy is suitable because the response of U.S. prices should be related to the increase in imports normalized by U.S. demand rather 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 A sector's labor intensity is defined as the average of U.S. unskilled labor expenditures from 1997 to 2006 divided by expenditures on capital over the same period using data from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers. It should be noted that the use of U.S. labor intensity instead of LWC labor intensity is appropriate because the latter would reflect the equilibrium outcome of demand and supply in each local industry and hence be affected by macroeconomic shocks in LWCs. The empirical strategy requires an external measure of an industry's ''intrinsic labor intensity'', i.e., a variable reflecting the fact that in some industries there are technological reasons to use more labor than in other industries. The key assumption, therefore, is the following: if it is true that in the United States, the production of textiles requires relatively more labor than the production of automotive equipment does, the same is true in the nine LWCs. We are unaware of any evidence that this assumption-which is used in a wide variety of trade studies including Trefler (1993) , Davis and Weinstein (2001) , and Romalis (2004)-is invalidated by the data. Second, this definition of labor intensity ignores the labor intensity of the inputs used in production because both U.S.-and LWC-based firms can buy these inputs at world market prices. Consequently, the labor intensity of inputs does not affect the comparative advantage of LWC-based firms. In contrast, the labor intensity of the industry itself does affect the cost of production and the comparative advantage of LWC based firms.
How did the composition of imports from LWCs evolve over time? Fig. 2 documents the evolution of the average U.S. labor expenditure on U.S. imports originating from China, Mexico, the other seven LWCs, and the rest of the world. China's imports are the most labor intensive. The labor expenditure share of China's imports remained remarkably stable from 1997 to 2006. In this period, the labor expenditure share decreased only slightly from 82.9% to 81.5%. In contrast, the labor intensities of imports from Mexico and the seven other LWCs increased during the last decade. For Mexico, this increase was more pronounced, with the average labor expenditure share increasing from 66.8% in 1997 to 70.9% in 2006; this pattern is most likely explained by Mexico's participation in NAFTA. Similarly, the average labor expenditure share of the remaining seven LWCs increased from 76.0% to 77.8% during the same 10-year period.
Predicting marginal trade flows
The discussion next turns to whether the patterns from Figs interaction of a sector's U.S. labor intensity and the growth rate of LWC industrial output can explain changes in U.S. lowwage import competition. In the OLS estimates of Table 1 , the dependent variable is the absolute year-to-year change of import competition from a selected country. For example, in column 1, the dependent variable is the absolute change of imports from China divided by the size of the respective U.S. sector. U.S. sector size is defined as the value of domestic shipments plus the values of total U.S. imports. In the random effects model in column 1, the independent variables are the growth of Chinese industrial output, sectoral U.S. labor intensity, and the interaction between the two ðg china li j Þ. The coefficient of g lwc li j is + 0.0209 and highly significant; that is, when China's industrial capacity grows, exports to the United States increase in labor-intensive sectors. The main coefficient of the growth rate of output itself is insignificant, but it is also positive at 0.0099. What do these coefficients imply? In the examined sample of 325 manufacturing industries, the 25th percentile of labor intensity equals about 3, while the 75th percentile is equal to 7.5. For example, if the growth rate of Chinese industrial output is 10%, the value of U.S. imports in industry k with labor intensity li k ¼ 3 increases by (2.09% n 3+ 0.99%)n 0.1 or 0.73 percentage points. For the same 10% change in Chinese output, U.S. imports in industry j which is more labor-intensive ðli j ¼ 7:5Þ increase by 1.67 percentage points. That is, when China grows by 10% in a year, the import competition from China will grow by nearly one percentage point more in sector j than in sector k.
In column 2, fixed effects are added to the estimation to filter out sectoral trends. Because labor intensity is averaged over time and does not vary within a sector, it is dropped from the estimation. Next, in column 3, the regressions include time dummies. Because the growth of Chinese industrial production is an aggregate variable, this regressor is dropped from the estimation when time dummies are introduced. Column 4 repeats the specification of column 3 for imports from India. The coefficients for growth interacted with U.S. labor intensity are positive and significant.
The analysis next turns to two falsification exercises that are important for the identification restriction in the next section. The growth of LWC imports in labor-intensive sectors may also be due to U.S. demand shocks that are biased towards labor-intensive goods. The first falsification exercise repeats the analysis for Japan in column 5. This regression shows that U.S. labor intensity multiplied by manufacturing growth in Japan is not significantly correlated with changes in its import share. As a further counterfactual, Japanese trade is instrumented with Japanese growth interacted with U.S. skill intensity. The measure of skill intensity is constructed by averaging the U.S. share of non-production workers of total employees averaged from 1997 to 2006. While this measure can predict changes in imports from Japan (see column 6), it fails to predict imports from China (column 7). Notes: Table 1 presents the relation between the national manufacturing output growth rate, factor intensity, and the growth of U.S. imports originating from the nation in question. The countries covered are China in columns 1-3 and 7, India in 4, and Japan in 5 and 6. The dependent variable is the year-toyear change in the level of imports from the respective country divided by the U.S. industry size. U.S. industry size is defined as the 1997-2006 average value of U.S. shipments plus world imports in the respective industry. An industry is measured at the six-digit NAICS level (manufacturing industries only). All specifications except 1 and 2 include year dummies and all specifications except 1 include fixed effects by industry. Normal standard errors reported in brackets; Ã significant at 5%; ÃÃ significant at 1%. Table 1 shows that there is a systematic relationship between changes in U.S. imports, growth, and comparative advantage. When labor-abundant LWCs grow, their exports increase much more in labor-intensive sectors than in capitalintensive sectors. Instead when a skill abundant nation like Japan grows, its exports increase in skill-intensive sectors.
Identifying the causal effect of LWC imports
It is evident that trade is endogenous to global demand and supply conditions. In this section, we lay out our strategy to instrument for trade flows with those induced by LWC industrial growth interacted with U.S. labor intensity.
The identification strategy begins with the true relationship between trade and prices. Denote U.S. prices at time t for sector j as p us,j,t and sectoral U.S. imports from LWCs normalized by U.S. sector size as m lwc,j,t . Also, denote the industryspecific trend of U.S. prices in sector j as a p;j , the common shock to U.S. prices at time t as e p;t , the U.S. sector specific price shock as e p;j;t . The true relationship between U.S. prices and changes of import competition is given by
Dm lwc,j,t ¼ a m,j þ dDp us,j,t þyDs lwc,j,t þe m,t þ e m,j,t :
In Eq. (1), the coefficient of interest is b, measuring the true impact of an increase in imports from LWCs on U.S. sectoral prices. A prior shared by most researchers is that LWC imports lower U.S. prices, i.e., bo0. Imports, however, also respond to U.S. demand conditions which impact sectoral price shocks e p;j;t . Apart from the unobserved export supply shocks in LWCs (denoted by Ds lwc;j;t ), U.S. prices also influence how much foreign firms export. Finally, a m;j is an industry-specific trend of LWC imports, e m;t is a common shock to exports to the United States, and e m;j;t is a sector-specific shock.
When U.S. prices rise, imports from LWCs most likely increase. Therefore, an OLS estimation of b in Eq. (1) is biased and the true effect of LWC imports is either underestimated or estimated with the wrong sign. The strategy instead focuses on a driver of export supply shocks in LWCs, Ds lwc;j;t .
We denote the growth of industrial output in LWCs by g lwc and a sector's time-invariant labor intensity by li j . We define ''comparative advantage-induced imports'' as the part of LWC imports that can be explained by the interaction of comparative advantage and growth ðg lwc;t li j Þ; Denoting the sectoral trend in supply growth by a s;j , export supply shocks are thus determined by
The key variable in (3) is g lwc;t li j , the weighted growth rate of LWC industrial output interacted with sectoral labor intensity. This variable is constructed as follows. First, generate a weight for each LWC country i by averaging (imports from country i /(U.S. domestic shipments + total imports)) over 325 sectors and over 10 years. Second, construct the weighted growth rate of manufacturing output in the nine LWCs by summing over the growth rates multiplied by the country weight.
6 Finally, multiply the weighted growth rate by the 1997 to 2006 average U.S. labor intensity of sector j.
Because U.S. labor intensity varies by industry and the growth rate varies over time, the instrument varies across both dimensions.
Because aggregate growth in LWCs may be correlated with U.S. aggregate demand, the identification strategy does not directly use Ds lwc;j;t to instrument for trade. Rather, it evaluates the difference in imports between two sectors j and k that differ in their labor intensities li j and li k , yielding
The reduced-form relationship is derived by substituting Eq. (5) into a difference-in-difference version of Eq. (2). The reduced-form difference-in-difference specification relating low-wage output growth changes and labor intensity to relative changes in prices is given by Eq. (5) with the residual e Ã p;k;j;t 1=1Àdbððe p;j;t Àe p;k;t Þþbe Ã m;j;k;t Þ. By construction, the residuals of any regression are orthogonal to the dependent variables and thus, it is always true that e Ã m;j;k;t is orthogonal to g lwc,t . The methodology can therefore establish the true effect of LWC imports if ðe p;j;t Àe p;k;t Þ ? ðli j Àli k Þg lwc;t . The orthogonality assumption does not rely on the absence of capital or skill-biased structural shifts in the U.S. economy, nor would it be invalidated if U.S. transitory shocks did influence growth in LWCs. The identification assumption is much milder and relies on U.S. transitory sector-specific shocks being orthogonal to the interaction of LWC growth and U.S. labor intensity.
In the online appendix, the orthogonality assumption is empirically tested. The results show that, while there is strong evidence that LWC imports are endogenous to proxies of U.S. demand shocks, the comparative advantage and growth-induced component of imports are not endogenous to U.S. shocks once adjusting for sectoral trends and temporary aggregate shocks.
Results
The analysis turns next to the main empirical results, which are presented as OLS and IV estimates for the difference-indifference specification of Eq. (4). This specification relates price changes to changes in LWC import shares. The empirical findings based on the IV strategy uncover much stronger globalization effects than are commonly assumed and reverse, for example, the ''China does not matter'' verdict reached by Kamin et al. (2006) . The discussion first documents the large difference between OLS and IV estimates in Table 2 and then presents the robustness analysis in Tables 3 and 4 .
OLS and IV estimation
In Table 2 , the dependent variable in Panel B is the percentage change of the U.S. producer price index for each six-digit sector. All estimations of Table 2 include fixed effects by sector. The presentation of the empirical results begins with OLS estimates of U.S. producer prices regressed on LWC import share. These OLS regressions relate our findings to the existing literature and highlight the bias in OLS estimations.
Column 1 shows the OLS regression of the annual change in LWC import share on the change in the logarithm of the U.S. producer price. The coefficient is positive and significant, suggesting that imports from LWCs tend to increase U.S. prices. Aggregate U.S. and LWC shocks may be more endogenous than shocks at the sectoral level. The regression presented in column 2 therefore controls for the growth of low-income manufacturing output. The coefficient remains positive and significant. Because variables other than low-income manufacturing may affect U.S. prices, year dummies are next introduced in the regression presented in column 3. Again, the result is that the coefficient is positive and significant.
In contrast to the results obtained using OLS, the estimated effect of LWC imports is economically sizeable and statistically significant when instrumenting for trade flows with the comparative advantage-induced component of trade. Column 4 repeats the specification of Column 2 without year dummies so that the weighted LWC growth rate of manufacturing output enters the regression. Consider the first-stage estimation in column 4 of Panel A. The main coefficient of the growth of manufacturing output in LWCs is 0.07, while the interaction coefficient of manufacturing Table 2 displays the relation between changes in the volumes of imports from nine LWCs and U.S. producer prices. The dependent variable is the annual change in the logarithm of the producer price at the six-digit NAICS level (only manufacturing industries). ''Ch. imports LWC'' is defined as the y/y absolute change in (LWC imports/U.S. industry size). U.S. industry size is defined as the 1997-2006 average value of U.S. shipments plus world imports. In columns 2 and 4, ''Ch. % LWC manufacturing'' is the weighted average growth rate of manufacturing output in the nine LWCs. In the lower Panel A the first-stage relation is displayed. The instrument is the sector's labor intensity multiplied by ''Ch. % LWC manufacturing''. All estimations include fixed effects by sector. Normal standard errors reported in brackets; Ã significant at 5%; ÃÃ significant at 1%. Table 3 present robustness tests for the relation between changes in LWC import competition and U.S. producer prices. The dependent variable in Panel B is the annual change in the logarithm of U.S. producer prices at the six-digit NAICS level (manufacturing industries only). ''Ch. imports LWC'' is defined as the y/y absolute change in (LWC imports/U.S. industry size). U.S. industry size is defined as the 1997-2006 average value of U.S. shipments plus world imports. Also ''net imports LWC ''in column 6 and ''imports China'' in column 7 are normalized by the U.S. industry size. Panel A presents the first-stage estimation. ''Ch. % LWC manufacturing output'' is the weighted average growth rate of manufacturing output in the nine LWCs. The instrument employed is labor intensity multiplied by ''Ch. % LWC [or Chinese in 6] manufacturing output''. ''Productivity'' in column 2 refers to the four-, five-, or six-digit NAICS productivity growth from the BLS. ''Raw material intensity'' is equal to the 1997-2006 average expenditures on fuel, electricity, and materials divided by economic value added. The ''parts'' dummy is constructed following Schott (2004) . For the construction of ''physical import volume'' see the main text. All estimations include fixed effects by sector and year dummies. Normal standard errors reported in brackets; Ã significant at 5%; ÃÃ significant at 1%. growth rate multiplied by labor intensity is 0.03. If LWCs grow by 10%, the import share increases by 0.7% in a sector using no labor ðli j ¼ 0Þ, while the import share of a sector with a median labor intensity of 5.14 increases by (0.07+ 0.03n5.14)n0.1, or by 2.24%.
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Consider next the second-stage estimation in column 4 of Panel B. If LWCs grow, the import share increases in laborintensive sectors. This comparative advantage-induced component of trade leads to a large downward pressure on prices: the coefficient is estimated at À 2.356. That is, a 1% increase in the LWC share of the U.S. sector reduces U.S. producer prices by nearly 2.4%.
We proceed by estimating the main specification including fixed effects and year dummies in column 5. Because the manufacturing output growth rate consists of one aggregate number per year, it is dropped from the estimation with year dummies. In the specification of column 5, all sector specific averages and aggregate shocks are filtered out. Again, the estimates indicate that when LWC imports capture a 1% share of the U.S. sector, prices decrease by around 2.35%. Table 4 presents the instrumented relation between changes in U.S. imports from nine LWCs and U.S. producer prices at various lags. The dependent variable is the annual change in the logarithm of U.S. producer prices at the six-digit NAICS level (manufacturing industries only). ''Ch. imports LWC'' is defined as the y/y absolute change in (LWC imports/U.S. industry size). U.S. industry size is defined as the 1997-2006 average value of U.S. shipments plus world imports. Panel A presents the first-stage estimation. ''Ch. % LWC manufacturing output'' is the weighted average growth rate of manufacturing output in the nine LWCs. The instrument employed is labor intensity multiplied by ''Ch. % LWC manufacturing output''. All estimations include fixed effects by sector and year dummies. Normal standard errors reported in brackets; Ã significant at 5%; ÃÃ significant at 1%.
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Robustness analysis
The structure of In addition to increasing import competition, LWCs can also affect U.S. prices if existing imports become cheaper over time. The lagged level of LWC imports is thus added to the estimation, but does not seem to affect the coefficient of the impact of import competition on prices. The regression in column 1 of Panel B shows that the (lagged) level of imports is not a significant determinant of price changes. Nevertheless, a high level of existing exports can further explain increases in imports (Panel A, column 1).
Emerging market economies experience large output growth, but they grow even more quickly in sectors with high levels of productivity growth. Because technological progress makes production cheaper, prices tend to decrease with productivity growth, which could generate an artificial correlation between LWC output growth and price decreases. In column 2, the regression controls for productivity growth, with very little effect on the estimated coefficients.
Some of the sectors in the sample are industries that experience large price shocks due to variation in global raw material prices. Because raw material intensity and labor intensity are correlated, some of the presented results may reflect the fact that when LWCs grow, raw material prices increase, which affects prices the most in sectors that intensively use raw materials. Because the latter tend to be less labor intensive, this could also create a correlation between our instrument and U.S. prices, hence biasing the estimates.
To address this issue, we construct a measure of raw material and energy intensity using the data on expenditure on electricity, fuels, and materials from the Annual Survey of Manufacturing. As with labor intensity, raw material intensity is averaged over the 10 years of the sample and does not vary over time.
The interaction of raw material intensity and LWC output growth is added to the first-and second-stage estimation in column 3 of Table 3 (the main effect of raw material intensity is captured by the sector dummies). The coefficient of this interaction in the second-stage estimation is positive and significant, i.e., LWC growth and global raw material prices are positively correlated. Correspondingly, the coefficient of changes in import competition on U.S. prices is estimated to be somewhat smaller in magnitude at À 1.79, but it is still highly significant.
The construction of a sector's labor intensity does not take into account the labor intensity of the intermediate goods used by that sector. This is done based on the assumption that even if the labor intensity of these inputs varies systematically across sectors, this does not affect the comparative advantage of LWCs across sectors because U.S. firms have access to the same inputs at the same prices. However, against this backdrop, a concern might be that sectors with a large share of intermediate goods drive the presented results because the markets for intermediate goods are not well integrated and the labor intensity of inputs affects the comparative advantage of LWCs. To investigate this further, it is necessary to construct a measure of input intensity following Schott (2004) . Column 4 only includes 6-digit NAICS sectors that do not include 10-digit HS goods code containing the words ''Parts'', ''Input'', or related abbreviations in the sector description. The first stage is well identified and the effect of imports on prices is estimated at À 2.21, a figure that is very comparable to the baseline estimate.
The main part of the analysis examines how U.S. prices are affected by changes in the LWC import share for the U.S. sector. Because the import share is defined as the price per unit multiplied by the number of imported units, this share can vary both if the physical quantity of LWC imports changes and if the prices of these imports change. Because it is likely that U.S. PPI prices are positively correlated with LWC import prices, working with the market share in USD volume potentially underestimates the price effect of LWC import competition.
To address this concern, the analysis includes a measure of the change in physical import quantities using the USITC import database's information on physical import quantity measured in physical units (weight/volume/quantity) and reproduces the basic result using this measure.
9
When working with physical units, the estimates do not incorporate information on the size of U.S. domestic shipments measured in physical units and we, therefore, cannot construct a straightforward measure of ''LWC share in Physical Units''. Several steps are taken to address this issue. First, the percentage change in physical import quantity is calculated. Second, this calculated measure is rescaled by the LWC share of the U.S. sector one year earlier measured in dollars. For example, if the LWC share of a particular sector were 2% in dollar terms in 1998, and if physical quantity grew by 15% in 1999, the 1998-1999 absolute change in LWC share in Physical Units would be 2%n0.15= 0.3%. The latter change corresponds to the change in LWC import competition holding the prices of these imports fixed.
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8 The online appendix shows that the OLS bias is large for all specifications presented in Table 3 . 9 It is noteworthy that the data on physical unit value are of much lower quality than those on the dollar volume of imports. The main problem is that for nearly all sectors, there is more than one category of physical units and shipments are inconsistently classified into one of these categories. For example, some shipments might be counted as ''containers'', while other shipments in the same industry are counted in ''metric tons''. Owing to this inconsistency, physical import quantity fluctuates considerably; for example imports counted in ''grams'' originating from China in NAICS industry 325 998 grow by 185 600 000% from 2003 to 2004.
Column 5 presents the estimation results instrumenting for physical import quantity rather than the dollar value of imports. Indeed, the impact of changes in physical import quantity is much greater for U.S. prices and the coefficient is estimated at À 4.28. The large increase in the magnitude of the coefficient, however, is partly explained by a different sample composition; data on physical import quantities are not available for all sectors.
The Hecksher-Ohlin theory of trade and its modern extensions by Romalis (2004) and Bernard et al. (2007) make predictions not only about gross trade flows, but also about net trade flows (imports minus exports). The regression analysis should therefore also instrument for the change in net imports. The empirical results in column 6 indicate that net trade flows are also well explained by our instrument and that net imports have a profound effect on U.S. producer prices.
In column 7, the regression considers the special role of China. In Panel A, the regression instruments for the change in Chinese imports with the growth of Chinese industrial output interacted with U.S. labor intensity. The highly significant coefficient in Panel B suggests that Chinese exports have a slightly stronger effect on U.S. prices than do imports from other LWCs (compare column 5 of Table 2 and column 7 of Table 3) .
As a further check, we consider to what extent the results are dependent on outliers. In column 8, the regression excludes all observations where the change in LWC import share is more than four standard deviations from the mean. This restriction of the sample leads to the exclusion of 23 year-sector observations and to a substantially larger estimated impact on prices. Table 4 documents the dynamic patterns of import competition and sectoral inflation. Prices might react to changes in import competition with a lag, prices might mean revert, and import competition might react to growth in LWCs with a lag.
The presentation of the dynamic analysis begins by considering whether imports react to LWC growth with a lag. Column 1 of Table 4 adds the lagged value of the instrument and column 2 also includes the second lag. Indeed, imports react to the first lag of the instrument. The second-stage coefficient of the import share drops to À 1.74 and À1.63, respectively (the sample size in columns 1 and 2 is constant because the dataset includes the manufacturing growth rate for 1995 and 1996) .
Moreover, owing to the business cycle, changes in import competition may be autoregressive. The regressions thus control for the lagged change in import competition in columns 3 and 4. This estimation is not to be confused with that of column 1 in Table 3 , which adds the lagged level of import competition. Prices are not significantly affected by the first and second lags of import competition. However, lagged import competition has an influence on the growth of LWC import competition. Columns 5 and 6 examine whether prices are autoregressive. Column 5 adds the first lag and column 6 the first two lags of price changes. Indeed, both lag coefficients are significant and negative, i.e., prices mean revert.
Because a primary focus of this paper is to estimate how large the total relative shock of import competition on prices could have been, the analysis also considers estimates that account for all of these dynamic patterns in the data. The regression in Column 7 adds the first two lags of the instrument, changes in import competition, and price changes to the estimations. Also in this dynamic specification, the second-stage coefficient of the import share remains stable at À 1.71.
Imports and inflation dynamics
The above analysis documents that variation in import competition across sectors is associated with a large impact on relative prices. The next step in the empirical analysis is to investigate whether these relative shocks are sizeable in the aggregate and to consider to what extent they might have affected U.S. equilibrium inflation.
The exercise of measuring the aggregate effect requires comparing the actual realization of price changes to the hypothetical distribution of price changes that would have prevailed in the absence of LWC import competition.
10 In a first step, Panel A of Table 5 compares the actual change in import competition (normalized by U.S. market size) in the first row to the predicted changes in import competition that would have prevailed had LWC supply-induced import shocks been absent. The first prediction, shown in the second row of Panel A, corresponds to the first-stage estimation in column 5 of Table 2 ('baseline') and is calculated by subtracting the product of the value of the instrument and the first-stage coefficient from the actual change in import competition. This prediction reveals that LWC market share would have fallen by around 0.4 percentage points per year in the absence of LWC growth. This is expected, because as the U.S. and other economies grow, a stagnating economy will most likely see its market share fall.
To gauge how robust this finding is, an alternative prediction of the hypothetical changes in import competition in the absence of supply-induced LWC growth is presented in the third row of Panel A. The above-described exercise is repeated using the coefficients from the model in column 7 of Table 4 , which accounts for the fact that prices react to lagged import growth, that prices mean-revert over time, and that LWC imports also react to past growth in LWCs. With respect to the baseline model, the dynamic model predicts a more profound loss in LWC market share in the case of zero LWC supply shocks.
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10 It is important to note that the estimated coefficients in the above analysis relate supply shock-induced import competition to U.S. prices. Because it is not certain that these coefficients are externally valid for changes in LWC import competition that are induced by factors other than supply shocks in LWCs-indeed, the theoretical analysis Bernard et al. (2007) suggests that they are not-the analysis only considers partialling out the share of LWC import competition that can be explained by LWC supply shocks.
Panel B uses the resulting estimate of how import competition would have evolved and the second-stage coefficients to calculate the price changes predicted in the absence of LWC supply shocks. The 'baseline' prediction-presented in the second row of Panel B-shows that the impact of LWC import competition was substantial during the last decade. While the average observed annual price change was 1.76% (see the first row of Panel B for purposes of comparison), the predictions show that it would have averaged 5% in the absence of LWC supply shocks. For the 2004-2009 period, the estimates even imply that prices would have increased at a rate 4 8%. In a similar exercise, the predictions from the 'dynamic model' are presented in the third row of Panel B. The profile of the dynamic model predictions closely follows that of the baseline model predictions.
In Panel C, the estimates show how large the total size of LWC supply-induced price shocks is as a fraction of the total PPI. This exercise involves weighting the price shock in each sector according to the sector's weight in the PPI and then summing over all sectors. The first row in Panel C presents the weighted impulse derived using the baseline model. Because the 325 manufacturing sectors included in this study have a combined weight of 29.4% in the PPI, the resulting total estimated impact on the PPI is several orders of magnitude smaller than the average impact in the manufacturing sector. On average, the total shock to the PPI is estimated 0.60% per year for the baseline measure (from 1998 to 2006) and 0.44% for the dynamic measure (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) . The effect of LWC import competition is thus roughly equal to a shock associated with a 0.5% lower inflation rate.
During the last decade, the relative price shocks stemming from increased import competition were very sizeable in economic terms. However, on theoretical grounds, it is not clear that relative price shocks affect equilibrium inflation, because price decreases by firms experiencing substantial import competition could be offset by price hikes in other parts of the economy. In this context, as noted by Ball and Mankiw (1995) , it is expedient to evaluate the distribution of price shocks. These authors argue that in the presence of menu costs, firms adjust their prices to large external shocks but not to small shocks. Therefore, large shocks have disproportionate effects on the price level and aggregate inflation depends on the distribution of relative-price changes: inflation rises when the distribution is skewed to the right and falls when the distribution is skewed to the left.
We, therefore, examine the distribution of price shocks resulting from LWC import competition. Fig. 3 depicts univariate kernel density estimates for the two constructed measures of LWC supply-induced price shocks; they are calculated by multiplying the value of the instrument by the appropriate first-and second-stage coefficients. The size of the price shock is measured as a percentage and is displayed on the horizontal axis, while the density (in sector-year observations) is displayed on the vertical axis. Both estimated distributions of shocks are highly left skewed, implying that the distribution of price changes would have been much more right skewed had these shocks not been present. Thus, considerations like those of Ball and Mankiw (1995) imply that LWC import competition is likely to have also contributed to the moderation of U.S. aggregate inflation in the examined period. Table 5 compares the actual change in import competition (normalized by U.S. market size) to the predicted changes in import competition that would have prevailed had LWC supply-induced import shocks been absent. The two predictions correspond to the first-stage estimations in column 5 of Table 2 ('baseline') and column 7 of Table 4 ('dynamic'): they are calculated by subtracting the product of the value of the instrument times the appropriate first-stage coefficient(s) from the actual change in import competition. Panel B compares the actual change in U.S. prices to the predicted U.S. price change that would have prevailed had LWC supply-induced import shocks been absent. The two predictions correspond to the estimations in column 5 of Table 2 ('baseline') and column 7 of Table 4 ('dynamic') and are calculated by subtracting the product of the value of the instrument and the appropriate first-and second-stage coefficients from the actual change in import competition. Panel A and B present the unweighted average in 325 U.S. manufacturing sectors. Panel C presents the effect of supply-induced price shocks measured as a fraction of the total PPI. For this purpose, the price shock in each sector is multiplied by the sector's weight in the PPI and the weighted impact is then summed over all sectors. The total weight of the 325 manufacturing sectors in the PPI is 29.4%, explaining the difference in magnitude between the weighted numbers in Panel C and the unweighted numbers in Panels A and B. Because the estimation in column 7 of Table 4 includes two lags, there are no predictions for 1998 and 1999.
Conclusions
A new strategy is developed for identifying the effect of LWC import competition on U.S. PPI prices. Such import competition is special in that it is concentrated in labor-intensive sectors. Further, the relative increase in import competition in labor intensive sectors was most pronounced in the years when the growth of industrial output in LWCs was the highest, i.e., that the interaction of a sector's labor intensity and output growth in LWCs can explain changes in U.S. import competition.
Using this observation to develop an instrumentation strategy, the empirical findings uncover much stronger globalization effects than are commonly assumed. A baseline estimate for relative price effects is that a 1% increase in the LWC share of the U.S. sector decreases U.S. prices by 2.35%. For aggregate PPI effects, simulations show that the relative price shock resulting from increasing import competition is equivalent to a 0.5% lower U.S. PPI inflation rate during the last decade. Further, such relative price shocks are shown to impact the skewness of the distribution of price changes and, following Ball and Mankiw (1995) , are thus likely to have affected equilibrium inflation. Density of Sector-Year Observations Fig. 3 . Distribution of price shocks (kernel density). Notes: The figure presents two univariate kernel density estimates for the distribution of yearly LWC supply-induced price shocks, one corresponding to the ''baseline'' estimation in column 5 of Table 2 and the other corresponding to the ''dynamic'' estimation in column 7 of Table 4 . Each predicted impact of supply shock-induced imports is calculated by multiplying the value of the instrument by the appropriate first-and second-stage coefficients. The size of the price shock is measured in percentage points and is displayed on the horizontal axis, while the density (in sector-year observations) is displayed on the vertical axis. There are 2702 sector-year observations for the baseline prediction (constructed using the coefficients from column 5 in Table 2 ) and 2048 for the dynamic prediction (constructed using the coefficients from column 7 in Table 4 ).
